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- ., ~ ~

i nventor,

... -fl'-'00 _.

We worked together in OPC.

C:

What does OPC stand for?

L:

It was·.. uh ... it was uh the name purposely made very obscure.

I remember Office of Policy Coordination, or something like that.

I think, if
It was made

vague on purpose and it was formed by the State Department and Defense
originally, in the early Truman days.

Is this on?

L:

Yes·. I 'll turn it off i f you want me to .
No , t hat' s a ll right.

L:

I ' m trying to remember the year.

C:

I think it was 1949 and I 'm not
,. /'1

entirely sure of this .

But I was at Lowry

Air Force Base a · ~
S c.J,..,"f

+k e ..- e- ,I

tnat i's- Lowry, ~ the strategic intelligencej\w-lw=wE!

~

De.../\ V

w ~ s;

em

,.,

:fJ~

~

e,

teacher,

+he r

l ectured \ and they sent some of us from the training schools there down to
learn modern educational methods of teaching down in Alabama; tt must have
been the summer of '49, and I forget the Air Force Base, it ts a little
rural one in Selma,

Alabama, but there was faculty from Columhia University

up in New York down there teaching us and some of the Air Force was as well
to upgrade the training of " the Air Force training program ? and they wer e
runnfog everything on a percentage basis, all the grades· and everything,
and I' was conceY'ned that they had picked me out to go there, b.ecause that
meant that they were going to stick me in to teach for the rest of my care.er
in the Air Force, which wasn't the thing that I had gotten in the Air Force
for at all, and so I was trying to figure out how to, how to be in the top
ten, but at the bottom of the top ten someplace so that I would get good grades
I

and be well thought of and leave a good record but not be where I was going
to be stuck for the rest of my life in it .

So I very carefully in all the exams

and everything would mis·s questions and riot . . . and so on so that I was tryi'ng
to figure out what the class percentages were and so on.

And on graduation
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day that summer they ca 11 ed me up and congratulated me on being number one

tn tne class, whtch was the last damn thi'ng I wanted, so I went from that ins-tead
of returning immediately out to Lowry Air Force Bas:e in Colorado, l headed for
Was-hi'ngton and -made a fast vi'si t to Washington and among others, I saw- tni sCo l onel that I riad served with in the Phillipines, Ches ter, Colonel George
J:_

h im

Ches:ter. He was on the Joint Staff and"was telling,1that I was desperate for
sometb_tng to get off of teaching in the Air Force and that it was comi'ng to
i,.,,J. ~ .....!,.+
a desperate thing that the~ \sent me to a school for teachers and I apparently
made good and which. I hadn I t wanted to do, and could he fi:gure out some way that

I could get out of it? And he satd, yes, something was coming on, he would
sttck my name in the hopper and see if there would be some way of getti:ng out
of it, so when I got back to Denver, it was a couple of weeks la te.r, the guy,
Atr Force Colonel came through and ... whom I hadn't known and started talking
to me about a group forming in Washington for Cold ~Jar duty and my ears prtcked
up and tt sounded good and

r

said that I'm for it, I volunteer right off.

So

he satd, well I want you to know you are being favored very., . considered very
favorably- and you will probably heal" about it right away-.

I had jus-t gotten

my pl"omotion to Lt. Colonel, and among other things for the grades I had
gotten down at Selma, Alabama, for being a good teacher, and so the next
thi'ng these fol ks: came thrnugh and ordered me to Washi:ngton fol" new duti'es-.
And I went in and they were just forming this organization and they dtdn 1 t
meet tn any regular government building; we were meeting i:n a, part of an
in

l-owf\

old Naval installationAnear the Lincoln Memorial, and then in some tempo
butldi'ngs near the Lincoln Memori'al; tempos from World Nar II.

And I ~at

in and di:d that and i:t was fascinating work , Tti.ey- swore me to secrecy of
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L:
And

wnatever

r

was: doing and not even to tell my own family, and so I didn't.

r forever kept that to myself except right now when I am talki'ng about it.

!ntti'al ly I was working on Soviet Union problems because in my teaching out at
Lowry

r

had taken the Economy of the Soviet Union as one of my subjects for

lecture and bad gone. down to the public libraries in Denver and done all my
research tn open sources at the public 1ibrary system of Denver, and tlie Ai:r
Force was screami'ng at me to classify these things where

r had gotten them

fr-om open sources and anybody else could have done the same tb.tng, and probably
did, some other people, but ... l put together lectures that l. .. and surprisingly
enough the Royal Canadian Air Force asked me to go up to give the lectures· up
to them in Canada but r never did that.
of 1ecturtng at the ttme.

I was more interested in getting out

But when we were in Washington, my fami'ly was tn

Californta at the ti'me,- my wtfe :-and ·sons were out there., I had never moved them

+-o

to Lowry Atr Force Base.

rv1e.

It was an unknown assignment t\ and teaching was not
.

)'? e ,,. ..... a.. ..

my forte really I didn't feel and I never felt i.t was: •

e.~+

and I was· very

s·ki:ttts:h about getttng them a 11 tangled up in moves and so forth · and maybe
not staytng there. and havi'ng a very temporary , , , so they were still tn Ca, l i.fornta,
and when I moved to Was·htngton I stayed tn the BOQ at Ft ~ Meyer which wc1s
close enough. I could wa 1k.
to work every morning.

I used to wa 1k acros~s the oddge into Wa.s:fn' ngton

But the more r got into Cold War prohl ems tne -more

I got to worrytng c1bout the Phi 11 i pines that l had jus·t left hecc1us:e a,s th:e
G.... 2 and Army G-2 there I' hc1d gone way into the .-.Huk problems and had Eleen a 11
over the battle grounds where the Hol(~fighting was going on, had analyzed a
great deal of it and reported on it, and at the same time a similar thing was
w' +-'1

happening in Greece WRef"e" the Communist partisans in Greece fighting the Greek
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+-h~y

Army andtl finally- got defeated in Greece, but i'n the Phi'lliptnes they,

L:

weren't and

r

r

knew a great deal of ... a great many of the problems· there.

So

C

s:et ... tf.te ftght against the Communists in the Phi'lltpines

task for myself.

t

.18'. the number one

s:tarted worktng on some of the things that I s:a\>t at the

Hme that needed doing that weren't being done, and about then a Pbillipines:"
Congressman, Ramon Magsaysay, who was the Chairman of the Phillipine House
Defense Committee, came to Washington on some Veterans' benefits programs, to
get some help from the U. S. Congress, and he had Whal en, a Phi 11 tpine Army
Colonel who was an old friend of mine, this Montemayor is his name.
/I

C:

How is it s·pelled?

L:

MONTE MAYO R.. I can 1 t tell you his first name right off hand.

t

have a card in there on it.

But Montemayor started telling me about this

Congressman that he was with and said he had a lot of ideas about fighting
the Huks· and s·o forth and that he was an all right person and he said he
thought I vwul d like hi'm very much so we had dinner together and I got to
talktng and I tmmediately liked him.

We liked each other when we met and

we started discussing some of the things that were wrong, including thtngs
w ,.fl,. +t..e.iK. o-.. .... d.
.
wrong wt th the Phil l ipines· Armed Forces J;r;i~ thei'r dealings some of the things
wrong wi'th some of the generals out there and so on and we very much agreed
on that and then I started testing out some of my ideas with him and he liked

tt.

Well, I had put together a program whkh I had typewritten a,nd whtch I

was try·tng to get U, S. policy makers to agree to support in the way of helping
the gove·rnment of the Phil l ipines against the Communist guerri'l las· there and
they· had a,pprove.d it, the ideas that I had, and they were di:s:cuss t ng whether
ou.+-

I: s·hould go •

or not .

So Magsaysay was ... said he wanted to go back and talk

to the Presi:dent of the Phillipines on a program, so we sat in my room up in
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the BOQ at Ft. Meyer and I had a portable typewriter and he was sitti ng

next to me, and I asked him a question of what he wanted and he would reply
to me and I would put it i:n my words on the paper and it went down i:n sequence
the same as the. program that I had just sold the U. S. policy makers and in tne
same language.

r

showed it to Magsaysay and gave him a copy and fte agreed to

it.

t

And I' said that I wanted him to meet some people around Washington and
II ss .- s f-tfl.,"+
arranged a lunch for two days later and I got people like tb.e ASecretary of

State, so

r

h.qd about stx or seven policy i_ns:ide people in, .. it was Truman \s;

admtntstrati'on ... to have lunch with us.

They had a 11 been familiar witf1 what

I' was· pushing and by· and large were in agreement with it, and so her-e I got
tnts- fi'l i'pi'no and this Congressman and said that he had some ideas about how
to go about th.e Huks and he said roughly the same that I had been saytng.

And

all the America,ns were surprised at that, so it wound up they , ,. s·ome .. . two of
them went out later and talked to President Quirtno and got Magsaysay appoi:nted
as Se.c retary of Defense for having these ideas.
C:

Who were they?

L:

Well, one of them was this Colonel Chester I was talking about.

one was- a guy from State, whose name I can't think of right now·.
were from the Jotnt Chiefs and some were from State.

Another

But some

But anyhow, I have never

told this and this i's no deregation of Magsaysay who was very much a right
person in his own rights and had his own ideas and deserves every b,tt of
credit that he ever got for what he did as Secretary of Defense;

and i's one

of the few very great people I: have known, is solid all the way through ,
anyhow, after he had gone back to the Phil l i pi:nes the.y- fi:na lly agreed tha,t

But

r

could go out and try- out 'ITJY tdeqs in the Phi:11 ipi'nes and ther-e ts a que.stton
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allout -money and about the commi'tments of the U.s., and about then,
fl'\A-A G-

Prestdent Quirino was looki:ng for help with his intelligence and the ,~
A"' J.e...-~o •"'\ c~)
Chi'ef at that ttme was General Henderson who had been my Commander out in
,411 Je-r.!><• •I (?. )

the Phtl l tpines' at one time, and Henderson came back and said you'd be a
perfect man to go tnto that job. there.

I s·aid why don't you go back and

tell Quiri'no that, so he did and after Quirino invtted me out to work.
as· an intelli'gence advisor for him and for JUSMAAG.

These people se.ndtng

me out ... I had to have a cover and they said that's th.e loustest cover
we have ever heard of, you know, to go out as an intelligence chief.
satd, why not, Pm not goi:ng to be doing intelligence work .

r

l can do th.a t

on the side and it wtll all be germane and at the same time: I wi'l l b.e anead
of the game, you know, and they were all shaking their heads; they· dtdn't
want me to go at all because my cover was weak and so on.
C:

And, ..

So as a member of the OPC, you go to the Phtl l ipines with a cover

as an intelligence person?
L:

As an tntelli'genceperson, but a military intelli_gence person to advis:e.

4-1,.e. wei
mtltta.ry·... PhilHptne mtlita.ry intelligence, who were all old friends· and
t
o--+- .\--k-t- e.." l w t- ,,
whom l had already helped establish themselves after World War H A .reforming
the Pf:ti'll tpine Army.

So this was sort of taking up old duti'es b.ut among

,very close friends: of mine who were doing an excellent job and di'dn 1 t need
any advke.

The . President, Quirino, had to listen to them better tha,n he

did was hts -main problem, but one other thing happened tn there ,
cerned,

r.,, tlie

l was con-

enemy was far more ski'lled at psychological operations and

polttical operattons than we were because they ... they had sold themselves· to
the people where they were tn central Luzon and had a lot of support and

tt
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L:

was· from the heart wtth these people and not to thinking in a logi'cal

type of support, and l wanted to learn something about psychological
operattons.

I knew· nothing about it.

There was no military school on

psychologtcal operations, nothing going.

There were a couple of old books

on it from World War II, but nothing substantial and pertinent to the
campaign out tn Ute Phtlli'pines.

So I talked to friends of mine in the

Pentagon and got the names of people who, and also people who had been in

Psy war, and got the names: of people who had been practicing it in World
Warn and had some practical experience and were doing other things at
the time.

Many of them were journalists and so forth and had gone back to

their own fleld of journalism and so forth.

But I talked to the Pbillipines·

Mil ttary Attache and asked him how many Phil li'pine students, military students-,
were in the U. S and he told me.

It was something, 20 or 25 of th.em, going

to different milttary schools in the U. S.

I said at the end of their term

can you route. them through Washington and I will set up th.is school in the
Pentagon and we will all go to it, you and me include.ct.

So he did, and he

got all of the Phillipine students that were in the U. S. at the. ttme, go i ng
to school, to come through and we sat down at a school .. • I bad just borrowed
a room over in the Pentagon and got people coming on their own, they patd
their own way for it, and reminisce about what. .. told war stori_es about
-1-h.A--f
-1-here-wer~
Britishl) decetved us at Sai_nt Saens, telling me what
World War U, hut
. l
f or psyc ho l oglca
.
f t, tan k. com b.1nat10ns
.
d a1rcra
. wlJ,,'1.,,._J
_ meri-cans~use
t h.e y d 1' d , A

operati"ons against the enemy and they taught me one thing vr:ry clear, you
can us:e it tactically to get something done, all you have to fi:gure out ts:·
what do you want the enemy to do and then use psychologi'Cal m~ans to get
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L:

them to do it,

And there is either . .• he is in a hole, you want hi'In out

of the hole s0 you can shoot him, what do you tell him to get him out of the
hole, see?

Yem are right within our sight, we are going to blow you out of

there, we will give you two seconds to get out, when he jumps up, shoot him ,
see?

That type of thing .

But I used to remember that, so ..• there were a

number of things like that which are univers ally appl i cable .

I had never

thought of it before, but it taught me that. . . like a machine gun or a small
weapon like a 37 Howitzer or something was a support type of weapon which we
used right in combat along with . •. much the same way

.t:.t':

,:t

change the enemy over

to your advantage somehow or other , and also I learned disinformation types·
of things and .•. it was all to make the enemy do something.

That ' s what the

01'\

enemy was using4 us, and all of a sudden it is . . • suddenly a mystery starte.d.
clearing away of the simplest sort for me and I suddenly start understanding
what had been happening that seemed so mysterious to us out there .

And so the

·F ilipinos were on there, and so when I got out there eventually I started
of

psychological operations with somefJ these guys who had been in our school
together back there.

And we eventually changed it around and got some more

a nd I borrowed some other ideas from the Communists in stacking up the
on + 1-,Q. -+ '1.'nj f-o
polit\:tcal chain of comma rrl much along their line5 ~~ go back
doubling along the military chain of command and getting up to the top and
getting the attention of the top at the same time and getting some backing,
but getting them to work together out in the field very closely.
that I. . . w

But with

W<t-~

e~e set to go out, and I was going out all alone at first, but

I was· worried and r t ~orked with one intelligence officer in the Army a long

"'

time who loved the Phillipines and he loved it intensely, and I took him along
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L:

with me, Bohannan was- his name, and a very independent sort of ' per son, ·

S€lf- thinker , and he US€d to reassure my wife he was going to make s-ur e that
it was all right when I' got out ther.e , and the Huks·, he knew· them and would
take care of me and so on .

s~!f'J±':t . G-2

And he hadn't known what I was- doing when I' was
I would send ·my men in to view oper,-at.i:ons- w:i_th. the

out there.

Phil l ipine forces and then go out and figure out what the Huks would do and
go up and meet them when they would get out of the traps that the Army would
set for them, the Phillipine military.

I would figure out where they· were

heading for high. ground up in the mountains and jus t camp out on their trail
and talk to them.
C:

Why didn ' t they kill you?

L:

Huh.?

C:

Why· didn't they kill you?

sr-

.::tL-l't

0 «-p
Uh, I was sitting there one person and they· were a group_; d armed
L:
a...nJ. -1-t-. y wcv..Jd f,-t,.(/<.. ,. ,
Well , you would smile and so forth~ you don t t ki.1 1 a guy· la,ugh±ng
~

at you, being nice to you .

c:

rt ' s· happened.

L:

Not rea l ly, not really .

There is fear, you have ~

. . . 5=;,..

$

to show- fear ~

+-.

i::,u;r

.G-@ci;a;:;ss:: A.nd you g_j_ye them something else to think of ti, and · I: would ask them · .i:f
o r- ~ci d ~0•1t.e. ~D d
they needed cigarettes:J\or did anybody want a drink, · yeu · know~ They would
come up a,nd say, yeah, I ' d like a drink, you know, ins-tei:\d of; shooti,ng me- and ·
getting the drink they say, let the guy pour it for -me first , you · kn6w~

Now·

one of the unknown things that I have never told anybody! Pi:it snowed -me a
b~K.
country that the Huks went through. and sne does:n '-'t know: tha,t ,
lot of the ~
I'

know that she was·, that she was trying, was· helping them out from ti'Ine to '
i-oi..:,.i5; /V\A-+es.

time , just being fellow

~~,

you know·, sympathetic towards tfiem as·
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L:

indiv idual s and carry ing messa ges.

their eyes ... in Manil a.

She was a journ alist to them, in

And yet as a towng irl up in the provi nces, she knew

trail s up in the moun tains back ... and trail s ... So r
would go and explo re them
with her, she knew where Amer icans had hidde n out after tJ..~.., .J..-<.,<.; "'
~
and been
captu red by· the Japan ese.

She showe d ·me all these thing s up in the ·m0un tains-

that I would have never known other wise, and very few
peopl e have ever known .
fl,nd at one place there a Japan ese colum n after the
Linga yen,- 1a:ndi ng wherCN.c.A i!thur
was comin g back, the U.S. artill ery caugh t a Japan ese
armor ed colum n

back

in the hills there , and they had been clobb ered and
kille d i:l,nd their s·k eleton swere s·ittin g back in there and I used to go there ,
there was a bobca t one time
that came up from these tqnks: and I, .. my jeep was there
and he came up in the
-F!E>onlit night and sat on the hood of my jeep lookin
g down at where I was sleep ing
next to the jeep, you know, and it was the first time
I've ever seen a bobca t
;t.n the Phill ipine s, a great big cat, well, big, you
know, bigge r than norma l;
t0 me he looke d like a giant in the moon light.
Japan ese dead aroun d.

It was spook y enoug h with these

But that was their high groun d when they would come
off

o;E opera tions and the Army and the Ameri cans, and every
body thoug ht that they
were on anoth er,mo untain , see, it was down from the
plain , up Mt. Araya t, and
j,is:+. ..._J. oC: +k ..... +
®
they would head for the "San Bolis " range at that time
where they had their
headq uarter s and other thing s.

I did know where their headq uarter s was (illeg ible

phras e) accor ding to Pat, as a matte r of fact, I don't
think , I never asked him.
Thoug h I found out from other s where it was, but it
was on this route very close
to where I taugh t.

It's right next to the Air Force Base, Clark Air Force
Base,

and jet fight ers would come up and their first bank
would be right over where
the Huk headq uarte rs were.

It took me a long time to find out exact ly where

they were and then we went and we chase d them out of
those moun tai.n s· and they·
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went over to another range of mountains.

I'

had been ... close to the

problem is the reason I' was talking about it originally-, but I have alway-i,t
felt like that, if you are going to report on something, dontt take the word
of other people, go out and eyeball it and see and then talk to people.

You

get a •f a,r different feeling for the problem and the s-ituation, and so fortli, ·
So I got to know some of the Phillipine intelligence people in the -military·
who were from that part of the country·, who were operating up tfi:ere . and
,Ya,lerian0 was, one of them.

And Valeriano was in the Phillipine Constabulary·,

the National Police Force , and they originally were given the task of fightin9
the Huks- and he was running an order battle section for them, and I' used to
come over and help them from G-2 at AF

- - - - where

him make good in his work.

I' was• at thetime, · help

But he told me he was· bored to tears, he wanted ·

to get out and get up close to them, and fight them up close, and he had -his
men in close to them.

So ... and he was very close to his co:mmanding general ,

whom J' also knew quite well, Castaneda.

So we went in and talked Castaneda,

into letting Valeriano take his unit, his men qut and fo:l'.'lll a unit up very
clos€ to the Huks and fight them, instead of just gathering intelligence,
do both, gather intelligence ... so Valeriano ;formed a unit that they· called
the Menita unit, MENITA, it is just a Phillipine name, and it wasn 1' t any, •.
it wasn I t a battalion, it wasn't a company, it was· about a cqmpa,ny· in s·ize,
b.ut they were all volunteers and highly dedicated people and very, skillful ·
people.

He picked the place that was supposed to be where their headquarters·

were, 'Mt. Arayat, out from Pompanga, the Province of Pompanga apd p.ut up a
camp up there and lived there with his· -men and fought theHuks very close a,nd
he would take prisoners and keep them for a time up in his camp and try to
change their ways, and so on,

And also to leacr;n ,mqre a,hout what - the enerciy·
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was· doing.

And I was trying to find out as an intelligence officer what

t)I(.+

was, going on in this country where we still had di visions,1 in the Phillipines·
at the time--this was late '46.

Well, they· became independent in ~46 , but

just :Oefore that and we had, the Black Hawk Division was one I remember, out
we had the Phillipine s-cout division up the other side of them.

But I used

to <JO up and visit Val's camp and he would beg me to stay· there, and I didn't
know it at the time but he put up my name on one of the little shacks, tha,t •
he put up in his camp and ... hillside camp .•. and he said when you · are up he!l'e
use this cabin I've built for you.

And here were enemy prisoners being brought

in to be reeducated and everything and they saw my name and they figured that
I' ·mus·t have been a member of that group.

And I remember, I went in and I was·

trying to talk with Luis Taruc, their military· commander o;f the Huks·,

And his·

s--ister lived in a little town very near this place, just a few miles· down the
road from it, was pregnant and she was losing her teeth, so I went to the Army
hospital and got some calcium tablets for her to take, and I drove out there to
g;i:ve. he:t:' the calcium tablets and let her know I would sure love to talk to her
brother if he ever sneaked into town or not.

And there, when I got into the

town there was a lot of activity with the Constabulary troops· around searchi.ng
and there seemed to be a very nervous tension in fue air.

And I, the house was,

sort of da,rk, and the housewives are like Japanese women, they •.• take off; your
sh0es· so you won't get the floors muddy.

So I stood at the do0r and I took

off my shoes and it was dark and the door was partially open, so I' stuck ·my
hea,d in and said, ''Anybody home'?", you know, anybody here and everything and
some guns· jabbed into me and they were, it was Taruc's· bodyguard, I didn't
Li f-i "j

know it, they werel\ there.

And they said that they knew who I was·,

that I was

a.. spy and all I could think of, I said don\ t shoot, look at the ;floor ;

A,nd I~

Side 1, Recorded Decembe r 17, 1984, page 13--Edw ard G. Lansdale

L:

didn't do it, you know, to be smart alee or anything .

I didn't even

think cither than I was well brought up , too, you know, I said if youtre
going
to shoot me, do it outside ... what I would have said otherwi se, but I
said
deem it get the floor ... and they were brought up by their mothers , oh,
you never
, .. shoot somebody in the house, you get the floor bloody and the women
have
to scrub up after you, so they didn't and so I was stuck on things-.

They·

said ... they had seen my name up at this camp on •.. they knew· I' was with.
;1.,\e.

f'\ :

+ .a._,

C±H.--eg-i'ba-:e-phra se} unit they said.
0f mine, and they hated them.

C<..,

No, I'm not, I said, but they are friends

Oh, they are terrible people, and so on, they

s-a,:i:d.

Well, now let me explain somethin g to you, what :t am , r· ~m with. G-2

of the

u.s .

Army.

And let me tell you what that is, and I said do you know,

you get news· releases at your headqua rters and you get couriers to take
them

-t-"o

into the Manila papers,A print in the Manila press, and they risk their
lives
going in along on the bus rides and so forth into Manila to get them
in there
and going through the military lines and c heckpoi nts to get tnem sa,fely·
into
Manila.

And that's, to get your version of things·

c;:·; ;~ in the Manila pres·s,

and if, your very good stories will get picked up by the Associa ted Press
or
United Press· and translat ed and sent on to the United States.
very good the Preside nt of the United States reads them.
before the Preside nt of the United States that way.

And if they are

So you get your s·tory

I said, what I do, I write

reports· on what people here tell me and send it in to the Pentagon and
if they
are go0d storie s· and unusual one they get right before the Preside nt
of the
United States· much faster than some of these news stories do.

And I took out

a pad 0f paper, and these guys were listenin g to me, the e x planatio n.
said what do you want to tell the Preside nt of the United State~?

I

And they·

told me these things·, and they were telling me their policies· and why·
they were
doing things and s.o on, and I wrote it all down.

Then I told them I had c0me
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in to s-ee Turuc's sister and so on, and she was in the bedroom in the

back of the house.

I went in and introduced mys-elf and gave her the · pills·.

Turuc had gone out the back window when I came in the front door.
lSeen there.

He ha,d ju$.t

And the PC, the Cons·tabulary troops·, had g-otten repeir-ts• tfiat he ·

was in town and were looking for him.

Why they didn't go to his· si-s,t er' s·

house; even I ·, a dumb American, knew that thc1,t would be the place he'd head
for.

He knew other people in the town, of course, and some of . his, lieutena,nts

~ere from that town.
C:

You said awhile ago that ... was it Walter Beetle Smith. that started OPC?

L:

No, he was at the time I went to the Phillipines·, he was• the head of · Cr A,

and OPC was· started originally by Secretary of Defense ... died while he was in
office, right after world War r:r.,,in the 40's ...
C:

was· it (illegible phrc1,se).

L:

No, Forrestal.

C:

Forrestal, James Forrestal.

I.Oh b

U::. A..O

And he and. / Secretary of State then ... who, · r can't thi:nkc)f i ;t
o,., +- k e.
;f
now·, but between them they did ... it was some Cabinet level discuss±:on ~

L:

Yeah.

thing but it happened right after the Pottsdam Conference , and

r

thinR · tfie

President had come back shocked from that meeting and when the Greek si~tuatiqn ·
was· going to pieces and other things, and they started suddenly-realiz ing we ·
Cl,+ e,.,11.
had pronlems· in the world that we weren •t prepared f o r \ And this, was· one o;f · the
early grop:j:ngs- on how to deal with it.

It facinated me, .. that was a great place

to be.
C:

Who was your boss· then in OPC?

L:

J: ' 11 tell you his: na,me when I remember ... can thi;nk. of it.

Department of State.

He was· cf;'rom >tfie

It will take me a little wnile to think of ' fi:b:;: name ·, . He
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... we became very close friends and his son who was a Junior, sa;ne name,

is- still with State,

He went over to London finally and had some difficu lty

-mentall y, some -mental illnesse s.

And then when I finally went out .. ,when they

a.malga-mated with CIA, they formed a Far East Division and Dick Stillwe ll was
the Chief of the Division and he was an Army Colonel at the t;t:me.

And so when

I'. .. finally when I got out, right before I went out to tne Phillipi nes'
lie was

-made Division Chief so they ... I went under their respons ibility-, a,nd they
supervis ed the thing for me.

There was another guy went out.,,no t right with

-me .. ,Bohanna n went with, me and he's dead now.
would be someone to talk to there.
after I got there, was Ace Ellis.

His widow- is in Manila and · it

But the other one, they s-ent out immedia tely
He was the commun ications man with _a CIA

oa.r
oackgrou nd and was sent in to be e=.
commun icator.

And the three of us- lived

in a hous-e togethe r and we got Magsays ay to live with us in there.
C:

So you were an Air Force Lt. Colonel on attached duty or deta,ched duty

to ...
L:

Whateve r it was, detached , yeah.

C:

... to ...

L;

And I'm sure in the records it shows that I was detached to an Air Force

Base over in Washing ton or somethin g, but I'm not out in the Phillipi nes.
the same thing is true of Viet Nam.
me to stay with CIA and I didn't.
C:

When I came back from Viet Nam they wanted
I went back to the Air 'F orce.

You were talking about covers awhile ago.

to the Phillipi nes.

And

I'm not sure how this works.

Your thin cover when you went
After a time you reported to

CI'A or reported still back through your Air Force channels '?
L:
an

No, CIA channels·.

Yeah, I went into CIA and from there to the., .to Defense

the Preside nt and the rest of them.

C:

So at that point in the Air Force, the Air Force is your cover?

L:

No, no, I was an Air Force officer anyhow.

Why I was in the country ,

was a cover.
C:

Oh, uh,-huh.

T needed a cover and that was ... I was withMAAG originally\ I:n Viet Nam
assistant
when I went I asked the Air Force, I said why not make me an/ air attache, · and
L:

SIDE 2 ----

they said ok.

I went out there and the air attache, he started talking and I'

said, look, I'm coming in as your assistant and I won't be any- trouISJ.e at all,
and he said, don't forget I outrank you.

And I said, no, I outrank you, I am

sorry, but I won't bother with .•. and the son of a bitch wouldn't even give me

+i., €,/'"€-.

a place to sit down /\ So my first days in Viet Nam were horrible, really.

I'

had an alleged position as an assistant air attache hut · no sp~ce ;tn the air
attache's· office to sit.

I went over to the USIA chief, was a real nice guy,

a former tea planter, and I sort of liked him and we became friends just ..•
off the spot.

So he let me use part of his desk to file my papers- in.

The

CIA station chief wouldn't give me the time of day; would make me stand at
attention in front of him, and wouldn't help me at all.

My funds- were 9oing

into ... from the Air Force .•. I was getting my Air Force pay, was- the only· -m oney·
I had ... was going into my bank account in Washington with my wife with the. bank
book.

And I was scared to write checks, I didn't know-whether she spent all

the money keeping our house going and the family going.

Sor was without

money, no place to live, I asked O'Daniel. .. 0 1 Daniel had ·me -move in until ne
got mad at me and told me to move out, and I said you have got to :eind a place
for me, and he did.

No transportation, no nothing.

And I was· worrying all

the time that .•. people asked me, why don't you eat more, and

r

said I' didn~t

have ·money for it.
C:

I don 1·t really understand that, General.

If you were there in a Cii\
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C:

capacity, why was the station chief so upset with you?

Tf yeu were

there with a cover as an air attache, why did the air attache treat you so
badly?
L:

Well, I don't know why they did it.

They just :t;igured, he is- way out

in le:t;t :t;ield and we are going to clobber him while he is here. · And · I: couldn ~-t
ha-ve cared less about it.

I was very busy, abs0rbed in gettj:ng t0 learn about ·

the country and the problems and the problems· with the Communists cmt there, ·
and coping with all these unknowns.

There was tremendous language and cultur~l

differences and so on, so it didn't mean too much as long as· somewhere along
1

the line :r could catch up with myself.

And I used to write airmail letter,s

to my wife and say, I'm going to write a hundred dollar check. next month and ·
that I s going to be for my food and everything, so please leave $100', 00' balance · ·
;tn the checking account.

I would go along that way, and everybody thought that

this· great big powerful organization ... and I could never let them think otnerwi.se or they would run over me completely.

And so I kept quiet about much of

this·, and I think maybe they started inventing stories about me about that
time ... these great powers that

I

had which

I

never had.

So, anyhow, O'Daniel

ca,lled h:j'.s BOQ, one of them, and they said, well, there's a guy on home leave
right n0w and he can use his room.

So I moved ove:ir to the BOQ, and then I was

being invited to the top diplomatic parties and everything, and I was invited
to one at the Vietnames·e palace that the then Prime Minister was living in,
the one before Diem
·uniform.

/went

and that was the cme

r

went in a whi_t e uniiom\1,/ dres:S·

up, a~d I. .• all the guests were coming up in staff cars mostly·

and an honor guard was jumping

to

the salute and presenting the arms and

everything as they came, up and the doors were open.

And CillegibJ.e--means·

rickshaw) were around there.

there was'. the pooi' ·-man .,s,

There were two kinds::

kind and the wealthier. manls. kind.

The poor man's kind was the guy in a loin
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cloth and a straw hat.

And the bicycle on the front; I us·ed to nave a

1:tttle replicc1, 0f one around here.

But it was a bicycle '-3,nd · tnere . w:as, a, pla,ce•

,,

to ride in front, there was a seat, sort of like a rickshaw- s:ea,t ,

So ~ c\ndthey-

were on the street, so I went and hired one of these, and said, cc1,n you d'l?.i:ve
-me up to the palace.

So I gave him some piasters and here came thi.s: long line

of diplomats and this· guy barely able to get his bicycle up the. incline a,nd
everyth: .ng.
s:a lute.

And everybody presentin g arms and so em and I' :r;e.b:11.:ned the

They paid off the guy, and the Ambassado r and O;Da.niel were standing

there; they both. told me they took a very dim view of -my· arrival.

And I said ;

well, I' need transport ation, and I asked O'Daniel, I said, how about s0rne
wheels?

He said after seeing what ... yeah, T'll find you sotl)ewhee ls·, wfi:icfi_

he did, bless his heart.

He found an old

cv-2

Citroen, which.

I

loved ,

But

when I got in one of the French generals came up and told me, lie, sai_d, I' ju(:t't
paid somebody to kill you . And the guy, he claimed he g0t yeu in the dies·t
w-;tth a r:ifle this afternoon , and I paid him off.

So I unbuttone d my blouse a,na

opened up my shirt and everythin g, pulled up my undershir t and said , · ".!:ind
holes·?

And this guy was looking.

And so the Ambass:ado r ca,me over , and you ·

were jus:t mentionin g his name and, .. before,
wremg?

He came over and sa:i:;d , wnat "s·

I' said, well, this: 'French general is. queer and so ;f;orth~

sa, ti.s·fying, you know.

an:•r

This general said, I' 1 m not either.

But he was· the one that ran afoul of DeGaulle later .

I 1·m jus:t

He got '11la,d a, t ,me_

He was- fotl)enting the

Army revolt in North Africa against Metropol itan France in the ;f;'j:ghti:ng the;t?e i
And he was finally exiled to ... he lived in Spain for, a ti'r!le , I' tliink fie is·
ba,ck rec e ntly in ·France again.

He had made quite a name f ci5r hi'tl)self as

a, ve r y unconven tional w;3,rrior out in Indochina ; not only· in 'V:i;et Nam but · a,ls'C>
in Cambodia and La0s.

r will remember his· name after c\ time.

r

had • an f>,,fa;,
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'Force doctor here in the hospita l not too long ago, the same name , -pro""

nounced differen tly, but the same as this· Frenchm an,
any relative , and he said, no, T'm not.

:r said I h~pe ycm · a 'l'.'en t t

So I said, well, the guy t'l'.'ied te

get me killed once and now I'm trusting my life to yC!lu, and :r figured you
-might be up to the wrong things.
C:

-~ fr\.o+.

And he said, oh, no , .no. ~ y-.

You worked then for the CIA in Viet Nam .

intellig ence board.

I picked up some place or other- that you wer-e a, member

'iO

of the (.intelli gible) committe e ?
L:

Later on you we;r;e on the

Oh, now wait.

No.

r

After I left Viet Nam in

,:f- ~

r

~

56, I came back to the

U.S. and I left any connecti ons with CIA at that time; repe>rted in to the Air
'Force, who assigned me to staff duty in the Air Force in the Penta_g on, the·
beginnin g of '57,

And from then on I had no connecti ons· witfr the CU\.

Wfien

I: was on the Air Staff in '57, the Chief of the Air Force at the time,
called

me t0 h±.s--Ge neral White it was--ca lled me to his office and said, the Secreta'
l'.'y
of Defense will be asking to see me pretty soon and the Air ·Force would be
very favorabl e to my saying yes to them.

He was going to ask me to do s0me,,..

thing and they thought it would be good for the Air Force to have me do it ,

c.v t. e,"

YI)"'--

;-1-

so when it happens , please~c onsider

remembe r we think you should d0 it.

So the Secretar y of Defense called me in a day later and he said ,, ..
C:

Which Secretar y of Defense would that be?

Was that still John ::Poster

Dulles at that ...
L:

No, he was never Secretar y ... he was Secretar y of State,

C:

That's· right, of course.

L:

Tt was· Wilson.

C:

Charles Wils.on,

L:

Charlie . , .somethi ng like that.

But he told me., we. have: a, ·man who

we

think

/
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is dishonest here on our staff, and we want you to go in and replace
Office of

him and he is an Assistant to General Erskin, who heads up our

And this Office of Special Operations rides, hecrd on · a,11

Special Operations.

defense intelligence activities, as well as other special e>perational
Fron,

matters.

And so someone in that position has to be very honest.

AndJl every~

--I lie,

nody I have check with about you, and those are many people /I one thing they
all said was that you were honest, so I would like you to go in and take · tn-e·

s,,,
joh.

Zlrfld-I said, well, I've been up and talked to the Air Force Chief

o:e"

Staff and the Air Force thought it would be a good thing for the Air Force
if I did it, so I will accept.

So I went in to be really an Ass·istant to

the As·sis:tant to the Secretary of Defense.

General Erskin, wh0 was· the grea tes·t

• , . was· a Marine General, who had commanded at Iowa J'i'lna and so on · was very· well
known in the Marines ... 4 star Marine.

Was the Assistant for Special Operations>,

s;o I went in to be his Assistant, and he had quite a sta,ff thel'.'e to de the staff
work, scribbling papers all the time.

But the defense intelligence effol'.:'t was·

the biggest one, I guess, in the world a,t the time, ands.till is a very big one.
And I was: interested in the name, Special Operationsj I said , well, you ' kno~
that will cover the type of stuff I was trying tc do on the J?hillipines · and
Viet Nam and the

u.s.

is very weak in the Cold war.

we have rn::>thing to match_·

up with what the Soviets/ have and the Communis·ts· and so on, · who have a,n entirely·
different e x perience level and training level for this· type of thj:ng, a,nd
A;mericans aren't ready at all for that, and I' would like to develop tha,t in
defenses.

I said, no, you take care of the intelligence ends firs•t, a,nd fie ·

said, I'm not too well and I want you to bear down on it and among other things1,
learn about the NSA

which is Special Intelligence .

And so

r

went out for

a time with the Special I'ntelligence people, the NSA , and the Army, Navy , Air
Force types, too.

And wound up as overseeing it all. And the Army G-2, . the

A;.,.
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A-2, the Navy N-2, all came in to work with me.

I coordinated all of

I

their offices· as well as the policy level of it , and NSA and what would n<Dw· be

!!)rA, there was· no such thing at the time.

I guess we 'd have been the closest

to that except we didn't do any intelligence work.

Oh, we also ha,d the J 0int

Staffs as· an intelligence attache to ... and that was all under , .. Erskin g®t
sick with his heart, had a heart attack and had to g0 to the hospital.

And

he went out to Bethesda Naval Hospital with his heart and left me running the
show for him.

And this guy I displaced, I never understeod this, they· di.dn ~t

trust him, he wasn't honest so they replaced me with him .

And then he stayed

in and he was a ... level of civilian ... he was a 17 ... Grade 17, very high, and
they jumped him to an 18 for being that and sent him in with other ••. I ha,d to
do business ... they were doing business on things that we were in jux tapositicm ·
to.

And one of them was on a committee that I was on and theyma,de him chairman

of it.

And I just suppose, it was the wrong thing to do,

But they did that.

And I had known him quite well and he used to keep telling me he was a city
boy and I was a country boy and watch out, he was going to have this· country
boy shown the alley in a hurry, see.

It never happened,

He went to jail in

the end, but he was playing too fast and footloose on this.
C:

Who was this?

L:

Bill Goddell.

I don't know whether he is in jail or not.

:r:

last saw· him

going into Hong Kong on a plane from Bangkok, so ... Well, I thought he was in
jail at the time.

He said, no, they let me ... I'm proving my case out he't'e in

Bangkok, but I don't know what ... he was a fast, .. hot air artist, fast talker.
But anyhow, I, so I stayed with them and was Acting Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations,

Now, among other duties in there, was, to

represent Defense on the U. S . Intelligence Board, and at the time the Dixiec tor ·
of Central Intelligence was Alan Dulles and he ran the Central I'ntelligence Board
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And as- I remember, they had weekly meetings, maybe not, but it wa,s· around

L:

once a week they had a meeting.

And I w0uld go over to that , a,l0ng with the

Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence man, the NS'A man , would go along, and
the State Department had an Intelligence, the nuclear and energy- people did,
FBI,
over.

r

think that was the group.

And someone fr0m the White House would be ·

That would be the National Security Advise r. But Erskin was out f())r ·

about a couple of years and this guy that I had replaced was trying t0 get
Erskin kicked out for good, but when he started his first moves on that,

r

caught on and I went over to the White House and talked to the Military
Assistant to the President over there, and I said,.,and at that time it was
Eisenhower administration ... I said, my boss, General Ersk:i:,n, is up in Bethesda
with a heart problem and I know you went through the same thing- with Eisenhower ,
and I thought it would be very nice if Ei senhower sent s
and encourage him a little bit.

h ; f'Y\
·

~

a get-well note

Get it over to me and I will get it ove;t: to

Erskin by hand , so they sent me a note made up , a very nice little note from
Eisenhower, get- well, Gravestone.

His first name was Graves.

Graves- B, Erskin.

And so T took the note and I went in to a Secretary of Defens:e Staff Meeting ,
and they asked me to say something, and I said, well, it's not business , but
have a nice note here from the President

r

r

would like to rea,d aloud, and I'm

going to take it out to Graves Erskin after the meeting,

r told them.

And

that immediately shut off all these people who were attacking this guy, show;11j
that the President was backing him.

So that's what you learn in psy chological

operations is to operate that way, to work on the minds of your enemies- and let
them scare themselves into shutting up, is all that was·.

But then Erskin came

back after he got well again and when the Democrats came in aga in, when Kennedy
came in as President , they revamped the staffing of the Secretary o f Defense

I
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and they were getting ready to have a DIA, who had been working on the

:tdea 0ff and on and they formed an Office of Special Operations under McNamara

it-

and had -me, he asked me to be ffitrt. ... and Erskin stayed on in Special Op erations·
b e for e but they were breaking it up and they took NSA supervision away from . it
and gave it to somebody else.

They were creating a DIA in kindergarten form,

sort of, at the time, so they broke up the old office and most of the staff
went in on that intelligence work on the thing.

But I' just saved a couple of ·
5

c,4 L

-tea-fl'\

them on my staff who were special forces type and the Navy (illegible) typesand so forth, which I was putting together a staff of my own

and I just kept

them in Special Operations; moved up off the D ring I off the E i'ing, which . isthe best address· in the Pentagon.

I picked the

D
jj.

ring right back of . the

Secretary of Defense's office so I could be in there in a ·minute, · faster than ·
these other guys·, and got an unfashionable address but in the :5es.-t locatfom ·
C.d,U,'fj k -1- onJ

there is.

And afterwards when they /l.. everybody wanted -my office and I: go up

the't'e today, and I forget who's got it now, but the guy· with the s·ec!t."etary· of ·
Defense's ear is in that office, which I was trying to do originally·, hut it
didn '. t quite work out.

Bu/ ' anyhow, the staffing, the defense staffing of CIA,

requests for help on covert operations that would be approved at top level for
operations and be approved for defense help would all go through my office , and
the staffing of the top policy cons-iderations was· done by -my office · and I did
most of it myself, and it would usually be with the Deputy Secretary of . Defense,
m /.LC,"1
wi t h whom I workedA·m ore closely than I ever did with the Secretary of Defense.
C:

Who was· this?

L:

Well, at the end it was R.oss Kilpatrick, the last one, but befo;r:e .that the

guy died in office; shame, a brilliant electr0nicsengineer.

He di e d holding a_
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memo I had written him; he died in bed reading at night.

It was jus:t a

heart attack I guess, and he had a driver staying at the house , wa,s, go±ng to
/.,Je, •I ./-

drive him in the morning, had gone to bed and ~

;

'1,

a,,,i

d.

· t. t h e liglit was· still

on in the morning , and he came and told me , he said, this memo was in his
wh n he. d. ,e-d... •
hands• Ci:'3::l eg i b l e phr a se~) .. .
C:

were you involved with the Forty Committee?

L:

I don't know what the Forty Committee was or what the , .. co,vert opera,t_tg,ns,

used to be different groups, they had different names and

I'

did the defense

staffing of it, but only one member of it •.. whether it was a good operation or
bad .. . at times I would be present and at times I wasn 1 t present.
one of them was· a discuss-ion on what later

ecame the Bay·

of Pigs

I remember

r

and

OJ?posed

it right away. And Alan Dulles was begging me to shut up, you know-; He sai d ,
K€..-e..p bt.L-le-f-, E.d-1
you know operations, and I said, this won't work . You are doing thi s • the wrong

+o d.o

end, too, on the thing and he wanted Aa military operation without the wherewithall
to do it successfully.

a .-military,

And you guys shouldn't be the ones· to ever · do

operation, and ... a political revolution, yes, going up i n the hills again, yes,,
il('ld. he... ks 1 eci m.e_ 1-.. .-1- +o j O ; .-i : " < ~ ~)
but that is your bill of goods.
(Illegible phrase) ... and that was during the
end of the Eisenhower administration that fall before Kennedy was elected~

And

that ' s· when I decided to go out and visit Viet Nam again ... you see, I 1ve been
through these things, and when something

j' oe-5
wen-t.

wrong they w~

look around :f;o!l'.1 ·

-,.i-.~y!J.
scapegoats, and the way some of these crazy guys though:t: ~ ould point a finger
at me somehow or other,

I'

was the cause of whatever happened wrong , a nd I' just

wanted to be thousands of miles away and say when this happened, you · guys were
left in charge, and I went over to the other side of the world and know nothing ·
about i t, what you were doing, and the Assistant ... Deputy Sec reta,ry, o f Def ense ·
II

that time was, I' wa$: very clo$e, he is still very :f;riendly· wi:tf1-1ne 1 · (:;od~ this
is awful on my memory.

One of the most decent men I hav e ever known.

But h e
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backed me on going out and he said, it doesn't s€em to me to :fie tlieright

reason that you want to go, and I said, look, I just feel it in -my bones that
on+'ii!>

something is going to go wrong ~ and you heard my first reaction for it, they
a,re still the same.

And I want to bring the Joint Staff in to take a look ' at

the ·military feasibility of this, and, by God, we l 11 s,tick their nos~ in . a,na
make them stand ... so right after the Bay of Pigs, they had a, heai,ing , ana :t:irs-t ·
thing the Joint Staff was ... someone else got us wrong on this•.

And T said,

+ke-,-,e,,
you sons of bitches, I'd make you stand/land take the full load of the thing
beforehand, and if you don't stand up, the hell with you, I wasn't ±n the ·
country when you guys were making all thes€ decisions•. They sure . tried. I •
eventually
think even today, they will write a book/ and say that · T was· secretly toe guy--

(Lt..~1 " -e,-)
that tipped off Castro or ... who knows? /\ What Llw

was his name,

r have a

Christmas card from him - that's horrible - but anyhow·, I wa,s finally· retired
from the Air Force in '63 and on the last day of October, whether it~s· tne ·
30th or the 31st , whatever, however many days October ha,s·,

1 63

I was retired

And a friend of mine had just been appointed, or was· being appointed, director '
of Food for Peace at the White House by Kennedy.

He was the guy running CARE,

whom Thad known for many years and helped him out.

T think a great deal of

CARE as a charitable organization, run very, very correctly and honestly.

And

he suggested that T come in and work with him at the White House on Food for
Peace and come up with the ideas and so forth and keep my hand in and be availwil-1../,J,,,,

able to get classified information, and so forth by being at the White House
and r: said, all right, fine.

So I went to work for them as an unpaid person.

And I had to be sponsored by somebody,

so I went in to the Department of

Agricultu:r,e and they sent me over to be their unpaid man with ·Food for Peace.
5(;)

I' was~ on the Whi'te House sta,ff for · a, ti~e as

q_.,

~

ii,gri.c ul tur,a,l · specialist

J
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unpaid.

C:

When you retired as active military, at the same time, then , did you ·

retire as active intelligence?
L:

Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.

I retired from all other duties and went in for

P0od for Peace and stayed there until '65, sometime in the spring, when Henry
Cabot Lodge told me, asked me to have lunch with him, which I' did, and said
that President Johnson, by that time, President Johnson
go as his assistant to V'iet Nam.

wantedme to

go out ,

Lodge was going out as• Ambassador, and he

wo uld take care of me and he said, I will come up with a name for what you
should be doing so •.. that makes sense to everybody, but/
the country.

want you to pacify

Well, I started talking to him; he had different idea, conc ept

of pacification than I did and, along with most Americans, they have an idea
the military go in and shoot up everything and everything, and while the
strong military there this other thing comes in and does something so you
can · t quite see, but it's got everybody peaceful and they· give up all thei:I;'
ways· and · so forth.

And I've had military generals, including this guy that l•s·
,.. f--y, s
<..-4 4..,S
~
~e..
""4,
one of my enemies (illegible phra se) -& .i, G-3, yelling at me once •0 ~ . I just
J

c~ )

.,\-

+"-:

said, you guys go in and kill these people, civilians, in a village and you
expect me to show up on the scene and go over it with a magic wand like this-,
and they all immediately say, we love you Americans, and come up and kiss us·
0n the cheek.
C:
p<L,l<.Se.

i

,1

-,....

It is just ... human nature isn't like that.

It's· not like that.
Pe.

L:

... is a very fine person.

C:

Why did it ... why was it important for you to keep your relationship with

CU\ s.o quiet ?
L:

Would it interfere with what you hoped to do?

Well, no, it was·, it was a requirement of working with. them.

They were . ·

the ones that came to me and asked me to swear never to tell · anybody , 'ivhicfi I: did.

/
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And I can see why, the other things they were doing,

is- going d0wn, unfairly I think in part.

Thi.s, reputa,ti'.<'!)n '

They 1 -ve d0ne -many- brave, wonderful

things, altruistic things· that Americans could be -v ery proud of.

hecb<
-me get that Operation BrotherA going,

Tfrey- helped

which the Filipinos got full credit

for, but which largely the work of CIA with an international organizati,~n;
which was one of the finest operations the world has ever seen towards- helping
other nations and people in need down in the countryside where, you · know-, apa;rt
from governments and everything, and the Communists had to imitate the thing,
and it was a type of Cold War activity that I think even they got sort of
proud of doing.

They got the East Germans and someone else in on the thing,

I forget who now it was, they got medical teams in and so on.

And in the

Phillipines it was helping them run an honest, decent election where the votes
were counted and fairly and getting the Filipinos to do it.
scream a lot, but they don't want any CIA interference.

The Filipinos· st±ll

Well, God damn it, if

I were a citizen of a foreign country and got decent elections and everything
with their help, I would ask for them, would you please come in and keep an eye
on these rascals running things in there.
C:

What did they do to help?

L:

Well, I got them very quietly to fund certain organizations, g±ve them
N /l~f'~t-1

enough money to get going and come to life there ... NMFREL (,?) was one of tfiem.,.
National Movement for Free Elections, which the Filipinos still have alive, out
in the Phillipines· today, trying to have some semblance of democracy left there
under dictatorship.

Trying like hell to keep free elect±ons going and Marcos h~s

emasculated it again ~ 0it hasn't any powers, but I tried to set up ways· that
citizens could keep their freedom free and untainted, a,nd so forth.

The U.S.

can't do it otherwise, we have no means to do it, hut in this: way, is· a wa,y· of
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opera t ing, and it needn't have oeen secret except that was- tfie eas-±e-s•t ·

way to do things·.

And also if these people went tQ cliea,t 1 wc;;mld p :izi ,nt fa,ls;e
.,._~

; ·\ t

ballots and everything, well, to have a fire in tlie printing plant was·,~ ,a,rid

"

all the ballots burn up in there, the warehouse, who else is- going t<"> do it,
see, and how openly do you ever talk about something like that ,
big plus on the right side of things, and well worth doing~

'('et it is.- a,

Well, we started

veterans' organizations out in Viet Nam and I was trying to expand the pa,rtic.:j..'j?a,"tion of the citizens in their government and everything and get it 0ut - i:nto · '

,,,
the country where veterans lived and so forth and I figured tney at leas•t, if
they were going to stand up and say we want this and everything , a,nd · w<;;in · t be · ·
afra.id of asking it.

And the government is· going to listen · to. : • these guY's•
11

fcmght, you know, and I don't want to figh

against a per, son like tnat 1 · n:e '- s •

a hero to all these people, and so that I S the way· it is- in thh,, c0un:brY', · j\nd
I started getting the people in Saigon listening to what veterans· out • in tfie
provinces were saying, and so on that way.

It was veTy· w9rthwhile. · And c3ga±n

I brought in a team of veterans from the Phillipines· to help , a,nd p ~ id . fo:r; ' tfie·ij,
way out of CIA funds, and they didn • t know it, they were in the CIA pay, a,na
would be highly insulted ~ith it ... they volunteered to g0 over and nelp some- ·
fellow Asians ~ g e n t ~ and they did it through a friend

0f ·

tlieirs 1 'Illy-self ,

and it was up to me, I'd found some mcmey, finet they never asked .me where l
got it.

I think things like that are tremendous ways of acting covertly• in a,

semi~open manne r, , and help some of the people that we were helping · a,nd every.-..
thing do things were earning more money than I ever was as· a Colonel in tlie
Air Force.
p eople.

And you don I t have to act like a hig shot and eve:l'.'y·t hing to fielp

As a matter of fact, it hurts rather than helps-, · tt ell 1 I went nack

to Viet Nam in '65 with Henry Cabot Lodge and it wa,si a, tiroe when · ou:i; , troop$•
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were getting committed there, the first time we had forces in combat and

were taking casual ties:, and I was getting reports from Saigon about the big

+,.---, +o

American establishment there, so I figure that we would have to live and ~do
things, in sort of a Washington style but in Saigon.

So I needed a staff that

would be able to cope with that and help me cope witfr. it , anda,lso q,ne tlia,t
would help me get close to the Vietnamese people and start influencing · tne ·
leaders and everything into doing the right thing and get the .Vietnamese
government and people so that they felt they were one and the same and helcmged
to each other, which is, the only way that pacification could ever work, · and ·
so, I handpicked a staff and just asked them if they would come out , and
everyone said, yes, they would come with me.

And one of them that nad been

in '1tleetings and taken my eye, and I figured this was just the guy, he was in
love with words and arguing and he will just take them and manipulate tnein
1.4,t,,. le., he·~ ci .,,-115
and absorb their attention, you know, ~ thingf and thi.s guy bece;me · ·
one of the anti-war leaders afterwards.
C:

Oh, Els ...

L:

... Daniel E:l::-sISury, a brilliant young guy, a defense consultant or some.,.._

tl\~\,exg
thing at the time, but he impressed me very much with his ability to argue a,nd
so on, so I brought him along as much to throw at the others in committee
meetings as anything else.

And Dan was very, very naive out there.

I:n a

situation where he had to cope with the foreign element a,nd foreign culture
and everything up close.

You know, don't drink the water out of the tap a,nd

that sort of stuff, which he did promptly and brushed his teeth,.,I' sai'd,
Jesus·, are you brushing, I forgot you have to tea,ch. these kids tnings· like ·
that.
C-:

Don't use their i c e.
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Yeah.

So he was always in trouble that way, but he also had no concept

of class,ified documents, and he used to carry secret paper s, in his pocket
and everything .

They weren't mine, but they belonged to the Bmbas:sy and a,11

Jesus, I used to go crazy trying to keep him clean cm that.

that.

But his,

heart was in the right place when he was with me, and he was always, t:i:;ying
hard, so

I excused all sorts of things for that.

But I' picked up some of

Now this guy you are going to see tomorrow is one of them and
~
Re-atrerek=P-1-> R
he was, an agency boy, Joe AA-~-egi b 1-e) it was , that they sent to ·me. out ±:n

my old crew.

4,l..

•

Viet Nam because he spoke French and I needed somebody that could talk to the
O" e. o [ t-k .e., ~ ,· r,; -~ '5 a- <>•<-- p s"
natives that I was talking to. And so when he ca.me in I it was,. , . a whole bunch

/-

ne~h'e. - me

OU t

there.

I was all alone until suddenly I got deluged with this:

crowd of , people coming in.

They would send a ... I sent a, ·message back a,long

with ... along with O' Da niel.

We figured under the agreement there was some·~

thing you couldn't increase the number of foreign advisers, see , except a,
certain number ... they told me so many Americans could come in 1 more than we
had there then, and we were all trying to figure out how to a,dd people in , so
I said, well, I'll take ten or whatever it was at the time and told the agency
and they sent up to Korea, was just unwinding at the time , and got guysdown
from the Korean theater to come through me, Ruff Phillips was one of them.

/!..& d.cL,·, I,(_
they had picked out because he spoke French in Washington and
-ReG€l~ek
But 50e
sent out to be with me, and all these guys came

in and I ••.

